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Abstract
We consider a market impact game for n risk-averse agents that are competing in a market
model with linear transient price impact and additional transaction costs. For both finite and
infinite time horizons, the agents aim to minimize a mean-variance functional of their costs or to
maximize the expected exponential utility of their revenues. We give explicit representations for
corresponding Nash equilibria and prove uniqueness in the case of mean-variance optimization. A
qualitative analysis of these Nash equilibria is conducted by means of numerical analysis.
Keywords: Market impact game, high-frequency trading, Nash equilibrium, transient price impact,
market impact, predatory trading
1 Introduction
In a market impact game, financial agents compete with each other in a market framework where
each trade creates price impact. Early papers on this subject, such as Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6],
Carlin et al. [7], and Scho¨neborn and Schied [24], consider risk-neutral agents that are active in a
linear Almgren–Chriss market impact model. Already in this relatively simple setup, interesting effects
appear, such as transitions in the predatory or cooperative behavior of agents. Extensions to risk-averse
agents in the Almgren–Chriss framework were given, e.g., in [9, 21]. For further developments in the
literature on market impact games, we refer to [8, 16, 10].
In this paper, we consider risk-averse agents that are active in a discrete-time model with linear
transient price impact. For single-agent optimization problems, such price-impact models were intro-
duced by Obizhaeva and Wang [17] and later further developed, e.g., in [2, 12]. A market impact game
with two risk-neutral agents was first considered by Scho¨neborn [23], who observed that equilibrium
strategies may exhibit strong oscillations between buy and sell trades if trading speed is sufficiently
high. This situation was further investigated in [20, 22], where the model was also enhanced by in-
troducing additional quadratic transaction costs, whose strength is parameterized by a number θ ≥ 0.
It was shown in particular that there exists an explicitly given critical value θ∗ > 0 such that the
equilibrium strategies show at least some oscillations for θ < θ∗, whereas all oscillations disappear for
θ ≥ θ∗.
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In [22], only two competing risk-neutral agents are considered. The main goal of the present paper
is to extend the results and observations from [22] to a more flexible setting, in which an arbitrary (but
finite) number of agents optimize their strategies under risk aversion. More precisely, the agents either
minimize a mean-variance functional of the trading costs over deterministic strategies or they maximize
the expected CARA utility of their revenues over adaptive strategies. We show that both problems
admit an identical Nash equilibrium, which is given in explicit form and which is unique in the case of
mean-variance optimization. More precisely, the equilibrium strategies arise as linear combinations of
two extreme base strategies v and w. The first, v, is the normalized common strategy of all players
if each player has the same initial position. The second, w, is the normalized common strategy of all
players if the initial positions of all players add up to zero.
Then we use numerical analysis of the equilibrium strategies to determine numerically the critical
threshold for the transaction costs above which all oscillations cease. In contrast to the risk-neutral
two-player case studied in [22], we now observe two different thresholds for v and w. Moreover, the
threshold for v will not depend on the risk-aversion but on the number of players. By contrast, the
threshold for w will not depend on the number of players but on the risk aversion.
If agents exhibit strictly positive risk aversion, it is possible to study the market impact game with
an infinite time horizon. This question is interesting when one does not want to impose an externally
given time horizon and instead aims at an intrinsic derivation of a trading horizon. We show that such
an infinite-horizon market impact game admits a Nash equilibrium in case θ is equal to the critical
value θ∗, which was determined numerically for finite time horizons. If θ 6= θ∗, a Nash equilibrium may
not exist.
This conjectured nonexistence is a consequence of the idealization of admitting infinitely many
trades, an idealization that also in the context of continuous-time models has turned out to be not
as innocent as one might initially hope. Specifically, it was shown in [20] that in the case of two
risk-neutral agents, a nontrivial Nash equilibrium can only exist if θ = θ∗. This negative result has
motivated Strehle [25] to include in the cost functional an additional penalization of the derivatives of
the continuous-time strategies. This additional term regularizes the admissible strategies so that Nash
equilibria exist in general.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we present the setup and state all results for a
finite time horizon. Section 2.2 contains our discussion of the market impact game with infinite time
horizon. All proofs are given in Section 3.
2 Main results
2.1 Finite time horizon
We consider an n-agent extension of the discrete-time market impact model with linear transient price
impact that was studied, e.g., in [1, 2, 17, 22, 23]. This model is sometimes also called the discrete-time
linear propagator model, and we refer to [13] for a discussion and further background.
Suppose that n financial agents are active in a market impact model for one risky asset. As
commonly assumed in the market impact literature, the unaffected price process S0 = (S0t )t≥0 will be a
square-integrable and right-continuous martingale on the filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P).
An important special case will be the Bachelier model of the form
S0t = S0 + σBt, t ≥ 0, (1)
for constants S0, σ > 0 and a standard Brownian motion B. All agents trade at a finite number of
times 0 ≤ t0 < t1 < · · · < tN . The trading strategy of agent i will be a vector ξi = (ξi,0, . . . , ξi,N)>
2
where ξi,k represents the number of shares sold at time tk. That is, ξi,k > 0 represents a sell order and
ξi,k < 0 means a buy order. The matrix of all strategies is denoted by Ξ = [ξ1, . . . , ξn].
When all the agents apply their strategies, the asset price is given by
SΞt = S
0
t −
∑
tk<t
[
G(t− tk)
n∑
i=1
ξi,k
]
, (2)
where G : R+ → R+ is called the decay kernel. The quantity G(t− tk) describes the time-t price impact
of a unit transaction made at time tk ≤ t. When agent j first places an order ξj,k > 0 at time tk, the
asset price is moved linearly from SΞtk to S
Ξ
tk+
:= SΞtk−G(0)ξj,k. The liquidation cost for agent j is thus:
−1
2
(SΞtk+ + S
Ξ
tk
)ξj,k =
G(0)
2
ξ2j,k − SΞtkξj,k.
Suppose that immediately after agent j, another agent i places an order ξi,k > 0. The liquidation cost
for agent i is the following:
− 1
2
(SΞtk+ + S
Ξ
tk+
−G(0)ξi,k)ξi,k = G(0)
2
ξ2i,k − SΞtkξi,k +G(0)ξj,kξi,k, (3)
where G(0)ξj,kξi,k is an additional cost term due to the latency in execution time. On average, fifty
percent of times, the order of agent j will be executed before the order of agent i. The latency costs
for agent i at time tk will thus be of the form
1
2
G(0)
∑
j 6=i
ξi,kξj,k.
In addition to the execution costs described above, we follow [20, 22] in assuming quadratic transaction
costs θξ2i,k with θ ≥ 0. One of our goals will be to analyze the qualitative effects these transaction costs
will have on optimal strategies. Such quadratic transaction costs are often used to model “slippage”
arising from various costs incurred by a transaction (see [3, 5] and [12, Section 2.2]) or a transaction
tax (see [20, 22]). As discussed by Strehle [25, p. 5], these transaction costs should not be understood
as resulting from temporary price impact, as all costs arising from price impact are already contained
in (3). Moreover, one can argue as in Proposition 2.6 of [22] to see that our quadratic transaction cost
function can be replaced by proportional transaction costs in a neighborhood of the origin without
affecting the Nash equilibrium we are going to derive. Since the main difference of quadratic and
proportional transaction costs is their behavior at the origin, it is therefore highly plausible that
similar results as obtained in the following sections for quadratic transaction costs might also hold for
proportional transaction costs. The previous discussion thus motivates the following definition.
Definition 2.1. Given a time grid T = {t0, t1, . . . , tN}, the execution costs of the strategy ξi given all
other strategies ξj with j 6= i are defined as
CT(ξi|ξ−i) =
N∑
k=0
[G(0)
2
ξ2i,k − SΞtkξi,k +
G(0)
2
∑
j 6=i
ξi,kξj,k + θξ
2
i,k
]
, (4)
where ξ−i = [ξ1, . . . , ξi−1, ξi+1, . . . , ξn].
In the sequel, we will suppose that agent i has an initial position of Xi ∈ R shares and is constrained
to hold a zero terminal position by the end of the trading day. It is often assumed [17, 22] that agents
aim to minimize the expected costs over the following class of strategies,
X (Xi,T) =
{
ξ = (ξ0, . . . ξN)
∣∣∣ ξi is Fti-measurable and bounded and N∑
i=0
ξi = Xi
}
.
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In practice, however, it is also popular to incorporate the agents’ risk aversion and to optimize the
following mean-variance functional of the trading costs,
MVγ(ξi|ξ−i) = E[CT(ξi|ξ−i)] + γ
2
Var[CT(ξi|ξ−i)]. (5)
Here, γ ≥ 0 is a risk-aversion parameter. For γ > 0, the mean-variance functional (5) is typically only
time-consistent if strategies are deterministic; see, e.g., [3, 15]. Therefore, its minimization is usually
restricted to the class of deterministic strategies in X (Xi,T), which we denote by
Xdet(Xi,T) =
{
ξ ∈X (Xi,T)
∣∣∣ ξ is deterministic} = {ξ ∈ R|T| ∣∣∣1>ξ = Xi},
for 1 = (1, . . . , 1)> ∈ RN+1. It can also make sense to maximize the expected utility of the revenues,
which are nothing else than the negative costs. Here, we will use the following utility functional,
Uγ(ξi|ξ−i) := E[uγ(−CT(ξi|ξ−i))],
where uγ(x) is the following exponential – or CARA – utility function,
uγ(x) =
{
1
γ
(1− e−γx) if γ > 0,
−x if γ = 0.
Due to the time consistency of the expected utility functional, we can consider its maximization over
all adapted strategies from the class X (Xi,T). Moreover, as, e.g., in [7, 20, 21, 22, 25], we assume
henceforth that each agent has full information about the strategies used by the other agents.
Definition 2.2. Suppose there are n agents with initial inventories X1, . . . , Xn ∈ R and risk aversion
parameter γ ≥ 0 and that T := {t0, t1, . . . , tN} is a fixed time grid.
(a) A Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization is a collection of strategies (ξ∗1, . . . , ξ
∗
n) ∈
Xdet(X1,T)×· · ·×Xdet(Xn,T) such that each ξ∗i minimizes the mean-variance functional MVγ(ξ|ξ∗−i)
over ξ ∈Xdet(Xi,T).
(b) A Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization is a collection of strategies (ξ∗1, . . . , ξ
∗
n) ∈
X (X1,T) × · · · ×X (Xn,T) such that each ξ∗i maximizes the CARA utility functional Uγ(ξ|ξ∗−i)
over ξ ∈X (Xi,T).
In the preceding definition, we have assumed that all agents share the same risk aversion parameter
γ ≥ 0. The case in which the agents have different risk aversion parameters is a straightforward but
tedious extension of the current model. It will substantially complicate the notation while not providing
significant additional insights. For this reason, we will only consider the case of identical risk aversion
parameters. Now let
ϕ(t) := Var(S0t ) for t ≥ 0.
We define for θ, γ ≥ 0,
Γγ,θij = G(|ti − tj|) + γϕ(ti ∧ tj) + 2θδij, i, j = 0, 1, . . . , N, (6)
where δij is the Kronecker delta. Then we define
Γ˜ij =

0 if i < j,
1
2
Γ0,0ii if i = j,
Γ0,0ij if i > j.
(7)
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Note that Γ0,0 = Γ˜ + Γ˜>. We further define
v =
1
1>[Γγ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜]−11 [Γ
γ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜]−11, (8)
w =
1
1>[Γγ,θ − Γ˜]−11 [Γ
γ,θ − Γ˜]−11. (9)
Recall that a function g : R → R is called strictly positive definite (in the sense of Bochner) if for all
n ∈ N and s1, . . . , sn ∈ R, the matrix (g(si − sj))i,j=1,...,n is positive definite.
Assumption 2.3. We henceforth assume that the function R 3 x 7→ G(|x|) is strictly positive definite.
According to Po´lya [18], Assumption 2.3 is satisfied as soon as G is convex, nonincreasing, and
nonconstant (see also Young [26] for an earlier argument). It implies that the matrix Γ0,0 is positive
definite for all time grids T. As observed in [2], Assumption 2.3 also rules out the existence of price
manipulation strategies in the sense of Huberman and Stanzl [14]. Now we can state our first result
on the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. It extends Theorem 2.5 from [22], where the
case n = 2 and γ = 0 was treated.
Theorem 2.4. Suppose Assumption 2.3 holds. Then, for any time grid T, parameters θ, γ ≥ 0, initial
inventories X1, . . . , Xn ∈ R, and X¯ = 1n
∑n
j=1Xj, the strategies
ξ∗i = X¯v + (Xi − X¯)w, i = 1, . . . , n. (10)
form the unique Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization. If, moreover, S0 is a Bachelier model
of the form (1), then the strategies (10) also form a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization.
Remark 2.5. Note that the Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization is unique, but that
we do not know whether the Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization is also unique. This
has to do with the larger class of adapted strategies that is admitted for CARA utility maximization.
However, it follows easily from the first part of Theorem 2.4 that the strategies (10) form a unique Nash
equilibrium for CARA utility maximization when S0 is a Bachelier model and all agents are restricted
to use deterministic strategies.
It follows from Theorem 2.4 that in the following two special cases the Nash equilibrium has a
particularly simple structure:
• if X1 = · · · = Xn, then ξ∗i = X1v for i = 1, . . . , n;
• if X1 + · · ·+Xn = 0, then ξ∗i = Xiw for i = 1, . . . , n.
It was shown in Corollary 1 of [2] that, for convex and nonincreasing G and convex ϕ, single-agent
strategies (n = 1) are always buy-only or sell-only. On the other hand, Scho¨neborn [23] observed that
for G(t) = e−t, n = 2, γ = 0, and θ = 0 the equilibrium strategies oscillate between buy and sell
orders. These oscillations are thus a genuine effect of the interaction between the two agents. This
effect was explained in [20, 22, 23] as a result of the need for protection against predatory trading
by the competitor. These oscillations also have a similarity to the “hot-potato” game between high-
frequency traders during the flash crash of May 10, 2010 (see [11, p. 2]). In [22], the influence of θ on
the oscillations of the equilibrium strategies was analyzed for n = 2 and γ = 0. It was found that there
exists a critical level θ∗ such that the equilibrium strategies show at least some oscillations for θ < θ∗,
whereas all oscillations disappear for θ ≥ θ∗. In [22], the critical level θ∗ was identified as 1
4
G(0). Here,
our goal is to analyze numerically the influence of the number n of agents and the level γ of their risk
aversion on the value of θ∗.
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Assumption 2.6. In the numerical analysis, we make the following assumptions.
(i) We have T = 1 and the time grid is equidistant: TN :=
{
k
N
|k = 0, 1, . . . , N} for N ∈ N.
(ii) G is of the form G(t) = e−t.
(iii) S0 is a Bachelier model of the form (10) with σ = 1.
In Figure 1 we observe that increasing the risk aversion γ does not stop the oscillations in the vector
v. On the contrary, increasing γ actually magnifies the oscillations during the early trading periods.
Increasing the level θ of transaction costs, however, will clearly diminish the size of oscillations. For fixed
n, N , and γ, we can therefore look for that level θv = θv(n,N, γ) at which mini vi becomes nonnegative.
Figure 2 suggests that, at least for sufficiently large N , this level is completely independent of the risk
aversion parameter γ, an observation we find highly surprising. In Figure 3, we provide numerical
surface plots for the function (N, γ) 7→ θv(n,N, γ) with n = 2 and n = 5. Together with additional
simulations carried out by the authors, Figures 3 and 2 suggest that for each n there is a critical level
at which all oscillations of v cease and that it is given by
θ∗v(n) = sup
N,γ
θv(n,N, γ) =
n− 1
4
. (11)
This conjecture is consistent with the theoretical results obtained in [2] and [22] for n = 1 and n = 2,
respectively.
Figure 1: Vector v with γ = 0 (left), γ = 1 (middle) and γ = 3 (right) for n = 2, N = 100, and θ = 0.
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Figure 2: Surface plot (left) and level curves (right) of θv(n,N, γ) with respect to the number of players
n and the risk aversion parameter γ for N = 500.
Figure 3: Surface plots of θv(n,N, γ) with n = 2 (left) and n = 5 (right) with respect to N and the
risk aversion parameter γ.
Now we turn to vector w. The first observation is that w is independent of the number n of agents.
Thus, the critical level θw at which oscillations cease is a function of N and γ only. For γ = 0, w must
be identical to the one studied in [20, 22], and it follows from Theorem 2.7 of [22] that the critical
transaction cost level in this case is 1
4
. Moreover, it can be seen from Figures 4 and 5 that, in contrast
to v, the oscillations of the vector w are influenced by changing the risk aversion γ. More precisely,
increasing γ does have a diminishing effect on the oscillations of w. Therefore, we conjecture that
θ∗w = sup
N,γ
θw(N, γ) =
1
4
. (12)
This conjecture is also supported by Figure 6 and consistent with Theorem 2.7 of [22].
Remark 2.7. For simplicity, we performed the above simulations under the assumption that G is of
the form G(t) = e−t. One can instead assume that G(t) = e−ρt for some ρ > 0 and verify that the
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above numerical results remain valid. Note that for large ρ, one will need a sufficiently large N to
visualize the convergence of θ to the critical values. Moreover, we have extended the simulations to a
power law decay kernel of the form G(t) = 1/(1 + t)p with p > 0. The behaviours of vector v and w as
well as the critical values for θ are again consistent with the above analysis. The corresponding plots
are therefore omitted.
Remark 2.8. As mentioned above, conjectures (11) and (12) are proved in [22] for the special case
of two risk-neutral agents. Already in this special case, the proof of (11) is quite involved. It relies
in part on the fact that Γ0,0 is a Kac–Murdock–Szego˝ matrix, whose inverse is known explicitly. For
γ > 0, however, the inverse of Γγ,θ is not known, and so the proof method from [22]. The proof of
(12) in the special case of [22] relies on the fact that Γ0,θ − Γ˜ is an upper triangular Toeplitz matrix.
The inverse of such a matrix can be computed by the coefficients of the reciprocal of the power series
formed from the coefficients of Γ0,θ− Γ˜. Then the celebrated Kalusza sign criterion is applied in [22] so
as to characterize the case in which all coefficients of the reciprocal power series are nonnegative. For
γ > 0, however, Γ0,θ − Γ˜ is no longer an upper triangular Toeplitz matrix, and so the proof from [22]
cannot be extended to our present situation.
Figure 4: Vector w with γ = 1 (left), γ = 3 (middle) and γ = 10 (right) for N = 100, and θ = 0.
Figure 5: Magnitude of the sum of negative components in vector w as a function of γ with θ ∈
{0, 0.005, 0.01, 0.1} for N = 100.
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Figure 6: Surface plot of θw(N, γ) with respect to N and the risk aversion parameter γ.
It is interesting to note that for γ = 0 and θ = 1
4
, the vector w has a particularly simple structure.
This is stated in the following theoretical result.
Proposition 2.9. Under Assumption 2.6 (i), (iii), and G(t) = e−ρt with ρ > 0, for θ = 1
4
and γ = 0,
w0 = · · · = wN−1 = 1− e
−ρ/N
N(1− e−ρ/N) + 1 and wN =
1
N(1− e−ρ/N) + 1 .
2.2 Infinite time horizon
For non-vanishing risk aversion γ > 0, it is possible to study our problem also for an infinite time
horizon. The intuitive reason is that any risk-averse investor will automatically try to liquidate any
position held in an asset whose price process is a martingale.
Assumption 2.10. Throughout Section 2.2, we make the following assumptions.
(i) The time grid is N0 = {0, 1, . . . }.
(ii) G is of the form G(t) = e−ρt for some ρ > 0.
(iii) S0 is a Bachelier model of the form (10).
Under Assumption 2.10 (i), the strategy of an agent i with initial position Xi ∈ R will be represented
by a sequence ξ = (ξ0, ξ1, . . . ) of random variables such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• each ξi is Fi-measurable;
• the random variable ξ takes values in the space `1 of absolutely summable real sequences;
• the random variable ξ is bounded in the Banach space `∞ of bounded sequences;
• we have ∑∞k=0 ξk(ω) = Xi for each ω ∈ Ω.
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The set of all these strategies will be denoted by X (Xi,N0). Again, the class of all deterministic
strategies in X (Xi,N0) will be denoted by Xdet(Xi,N0). Since `1 ⊂ `2, it is clear that (4) can be
extended as follows to strategies ξi ∈X (Xi,N0), i = 1, . . . , n,
CN0(ξi|ξ−i) =
∞∑
k=0
[G(0)
2
ξ2i,k − SΞtkξi,k +
G(0)
2
ξi,k
∑
j 6=i
ξj,k + θξ
2
i,k
]
.
Again, each agent will aim to minimize the following mean-variance functional,
MVγ(ξi|ξ−i) = E[CN0(ξi|ξ−i)] +
γ
2
Var[CN0(ξi|ξ−i)], ξi ∈Xdet(Xi,N0),
or to maximize the CARA utility functional
Uγ(ξi|ξ−i) = E[uγ(−CN0(ξi|ξ−i))], ξi ∈X (Xi,N0).
The notion of Nash equilibria for mean-variance optimization and CARA utility maximization can be
defined in exactly the same way as in Definition 2.2. However, it is not clear a priori whether the
formulas (8) and (9) for v and w can also be extended to an infinite time horizon, because it is no
longer clear whether the vector 1 belongs to the range of the linear operators Γγ,θ + (n − 1)Γ˜ and
Γγ,θ − Γ˜. The following result states the existence of an infinite-horizon Nash equilibrium in a specific
situation.
Theorem 2.11. In addition to Assumption 2.10, suppose that γ > 0 and
θ = θ∗ :=
n− 1
4
. (13)
Then there exist unique positive solution α and β of the two equations
0 =
1
e(α+ρ) − 1 −
n
e(α−ρ) − 1 −
γσ2e−α
(1− e−α)2 , (14)
0 = 2θ +
1
2
+
1
e(β+ρ) − 1 −
γσ2e−β
(1− e−β)2 . (15)
Moreover, α ∈ (0, ρ). For these, we define v ∈ `1 through
v0 =
eα − 1
eα − eα−ρ and, for i = 1, 2, . . . , vi =
e−αi
1
eα−1 +
1
1−eα−ρ
and w ∈ `1 through
wi = (1− e−β)e−βi.
Then, for any initial positions X1, . . . , Xn, the strategies
ξ∗i = X¯v + (Xi − X¯)w, i = 1, . . . , n. (16)
form a Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization in Xdet(X1,N0) × · · · ×Xdet(Xn,N0) and a
Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization in X (X1,N0)× · · · ×X (Xn,N0).
In the preceding theorem, we have assumed that θ = θ∗. In the general case, the following result
will follow immediately from the proof of Theorem 2.11.
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Proposition 2.12. In addition to Assumption 2.10, suppose that γ > 0.
1. If X1 + · · · + Xn = 0, then the formula ξ∗i = Xiw, for w as in Theorem 2.11, provides a Nash
equilibrium for every choice of θ ≥ 0.
2. If X1 = · · · = Xn, then there is no Nash equilibrium whose strategies decay exponentially in time
unless the condition θ = θ∗ := n−1
4
is satisfied.
As a matter of fact, we conjecture that in the situation of Proposition 2.12 (b), no Nash equilibrium
exists unless θ = θ∗ holds. The situation is very similar to the one of Theorem 4.5 in [20], where a
continuous-time version of the game for n = 2 and γ = 0 was analyzed. It was shown there that
a continuous-time Nash equilibrium can exist only if θ = θ∗ or X1 = X2 = 0. In both situations,
the underlying intuition for the nonexistence of Nash equilibria results from the possibility of trading
infinitely often, either in continuous time or over an infinite time horizon. This shows that the ideal-
ization of admitting infinitely many trades is not as harmless as it might seem, an observation that has
also been made, for instance, in the context of the FTAP.
The qualitative behavior of the respective solutions α and β of (14) and (15) is plotted in Figures 7
and 8. In case n = 1, we have the following explicit result.
Proposition 2.13. If n = 1, then the solution α of (14) is given by
α = cosh−1
[γσ2 cosh(ρ) + 2 sinh(ρ)
γσ2 + 2 sinh(ρ)
]
. (17)
Figure 7: The solution α of (14) as a function of γ (left) and ρ (right) with different values of n,
θ = n−1
4
, and the respective remaining parameters set to 1.
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Figure 8: The solution β of (15) as a function of θ (left), ρ (center), and γ (right), with respective
remaining parameters set to 1.
3 Proofs
Lemma 3.1. An admissible strategy ξi ∈ Xdet(Xi,T) given all the competitors’ strategies ξj ∈
Xdet(Xj,T) with j 6= i has the following mean-variance functional:
MVγ(ξi|ξ−i) = −XiS00 +
1
2
ξ>i Γ
γ,θξi + ξ
>
i Γ˜
∑
j 6=i
ξj. (18)
Proof. Since all strategies are deterministic,
E[CT(ξi|ξ−i)] =
N∑
k=0
[G(0)
2
ξ2i,k − E[SΞtkξi,k] +
G(0)
2
∑
j 6=i
ξi,kξj,k + θξ
2
i,k
]
.
Since S0 is a martingale,
N∑
k=0
E[SΞtkξi,k] =
N∑
k=0
ξi,kE[S0tk ]−
N∑
k=0
ξi,k
k−1∑
m=0
(
G(tk − tm)
n∑
j=1
ξj,m
)
= XiS
0
0 −
N∑
k=0
ξi,k
k−1∑
m=0
ξi,mG(tk − tm)
−
N∑
k=0
ξi,k
k−1∑
m=0
G(tk − tm)
∑
j 6=i
ξj,m.
Moreover, using matrix notation,
G(0) + 2θ
2
N∑
k=0
ξ2i,k +
N∑
k=0
ξi,k
k−1∑
m=0
ξi,mG(tk − tm) = 1
2
[
2θ
N∑
k=0
ξ2i,k +
N∑
k,m=0
ξi,kξi,mG(|tk − tm|)
]
=
1
2
ξ>i Γ
0,θξi,
and
N∑
k=0
ξi,k
[G(0)
2
∑
j 6=i
ξj,k +
k−1∑
m=0
G(tk − tm)
∑
j 6=i
ξj,mξj,m
]
= ξ>i Γ˜
∑
j 6=i
ξj.
Using again that ξi are deterministic and the martingale property of S
0,
Var[CT(ξi|ξ−i)] = Var
[ N∑
k=0
SΞtkξi,k
]
= Var
[ N∑
k=0
S0tkξi,k
]
=
N∑
p,q=0
ξpξqCov(S
0
tp , S
0
tq) =
N∑
p,q=0
ξpξqϕ(tp ∧ tq).
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By substituting the preceding results into (5), we obtain the desired formula:
MVγ(ξi|ξ−i) = E[CT(ξi|ξ−i)] + γ
2
Var[CT(ξi|ξ−i)]
= −XiS00 +
1
2
ξ>i Γ
0,θξi + ξ
>
i Γ˜
∑
j 6=i
ξj +
γ
2
N∑
p,q=0
ξpξqϕ(tp ∧ tq)
= −XiS00 +
1
2
ξ>i Γ
γ,θξi + ξ
>
i Γ˜
∑
j 6=i
ξj.
We will use the convention of saying that an n×n-matrix A is positive if x>Ax > 0 for all nonzero
x ∈ Rn, which makes sense also if A is not necessarily symmetric. Clearly, for a positive matrix A
there is no nonzero x ∈ Rn for which Ax = 0, and so A is invertible.
Lemma 3.2. For all γ, θ ≥ 0 and n ≥ 1, the matrices Γγ,θ, Γ˜, Γγ,θ− Γ˜ and Γγ,θ +(n−1)Γ˜ are positive.
Proof. By Lemma 3.2 in [22], the matrices Γ, Γ0,θ, Γ˜, and Γ0,θ − Γ˜ are positive. Since C := (ϕ(ti ∧
tj))i,j=1,...,N is the covariance matrix of the random variables, S
0
t1
, . . . .S0tN , it is nonnegative definite. It
follows that Γγ,θ = Γ0,θ +γC and Γγ,θ− Γ˜ = (Γ0,θ− Γ˜) +γC are positive as well. Hence, Γγ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜
is also positive.
Lemma 3.3. For a given time grid T and initial values X1, . . . , Xn ∈ R, there exists at most one Nash
equilibrium for mean-variance optimization.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 3.3 in [22] or Lemma 4 in [21] and hence omitted.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 2.4.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. By Definition 2.2 and Lemma 3.1, we have the following linear-quadratic opti-
mization problem: for all i = 1, . . . , n,
MVγ(ξ
∗
i |ξ∗−i) = −XiS00 + min
ξi∈Xdet(Xi,T)
(1
2
ξ>i Γ
γ,θξi + ξ
>
i Γ˜
∑
j 6=i
ξj
)
.
The constraint ξi ∈Xdet(Xi,T) can be re-written as the linear equality constraint 1>ξi = Xi.
To solve this problem, we use the Lagrange multiplier theorem [4, pp. 276-283] to obtain αi ∈ R
for i = 1, . . . , n such that the optimal strategies satisfy the following necessary conditions: Γ
γ,θξ∗i + Γ˜
∑
j 6=i ξ
∗
j = αi1,
1>ξ∗i = Xi.
(19)
We will show below that these equations are also sufficient for our optimization problem. Summing
over i in the first line of (19) yields
[Γγ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜]
n∑
j=1
ξ∗j =
n∑
j=1
αj1.
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By Lemma 3.2, Γγ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜ is an invertible matrix. Thus,
n∑
j=1
ξ∗j =
n∑
j=1
αj[Γ
γ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜]−11
=
1>
∑n
j=1 αj[Γ
γ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜]−11
1>[Γγ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜]−11 [Γ
γ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜]−11
=
n∑
j=1
1>ξ∗j
1>[Γγ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜]−11 [Γ
γ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜]−11
=
n∑
j=1
Xjv,
(20)
where we have used the second condition from (19) in the final step.
Now consider the first conditions in (19). Pick the ith equation, multiply by (n − 1), and then
subtract the other (n− 1) equations from it. We get
Γγ,θ
[
(n− 1)ξ∗i −
∑
j 6=i
ξ∗j
]
− Γ˜
[
(n− 1)ξ∗i −
∑
j 6=i
ξ∗j
]
=
[
(n− 1)αi −
∑
j 6=i
αj
]
1.
Further simplifications show that
(Γγ,θ − Γ˜)
[
nξ∗i −
n∑
j=1
ξ∗j
]
=
[
nαi −
n∑
j=1
αj
]
1.
The matrix Γγ,θ − Γ˜ is invertible by Lemma 3.2. If follows that
nξ∗i −
n∑
j=1
ξ∗j =
[
nXi −
n∑
j=1
Xj
]
w. (21)
Using (20) and (21) now gives
ξ∗i = X¯v + (Xi − X¯)w
where X¯ = 1
n
∑n
j=1 Xj.
Now we show that the equations (19) are sufficient for the minimization of our mean-variance
functional. To this end, we rewrite the objective mean-variance functional as follows:
1
2
ξ>i Γ
γ,θξi + ξ
>
i Γ˜
∑
j 6=i
ξ∗j =
1
2
ξ>i Γ
γ,θξi + g
>
i ξi,
where gi = Γ˜
∑
j 6=i ξ
∗
j . Next, for i = 1, . . . , n, we consider arbitrary ηi ∈Xdet(Xi,T). Then, by (19),
1
2
η>i Γ
γ,θηi + g
>
i ηi −
[1
2
ξ∗i
>Γγ,θξ∗i + g
>
i ξ
∗
i
]
=
1
2
(ηi + ξ
∗
i )
>Γγ,θ(ηi − ξ∗i ) + g>i (ηi − ξ∗i )
=
[1
2
(Γγ,θ)>(ηi + ξ∗i ) + gi
]>
(ηi − ξ∗i )
=
[
(Γγ,θξ∗i + gi) +
1
2
(Γγ,θ)>(ηi − ξ∗i )
]>
(ηi − ξ∗i )
=
[
αi1 +
1
2
(Γγ,θ)>(ηi − ξ∗i )
]>
(ηi − ξ∗i )
= αi1
>(ηi − ξ∗i ) +
1
2
(ηi − ξ∗i )>Γγ,θ(ηi − ξ∗i )
≥ 0,
(22)
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with equality if and only if ηi = ξ
∗
i . Altogether, we obtain that (10) defines the unique Nash equilibrium
in Xdet(X1,T)× · · · ×Xdet(Xn,T).
Now we turn to CARA utility maximization. We first note that the cost functional CT(ξi|ξ−i) is
a Gaussian random variable if S0 is a Bachelier model and the strategies ξ1, . . . ξn are deterministic.
Therefore, for γ > 0,
Uγ(ξi|ξ−i) = 1
γ
(
1− exp
(
γE[CT(ξi|ξ−i)] + γ
2
2
Var[CT(ξi|ξ−i)]
))
= uγ
(−MVγ(ξi|ξ−i)).
For γ = 0, we clearly have
U0(ξi|ξ−i) = −E[CT(ξi|ξ−i)] = −MV0(ξi|ξ−i).
Therefore, mean-variance optimization and CARA utility maximization are equivalent when performed
over the class of deterministic strategies. Next, suppose that the strategies ξ−i are deterministic. Then
it follows as in Theorem 2.1 of [19] that the maximizer of the functional Uγ(ξ|ξ−i) over the class of all
adapted strategies ξ ∈X (Xi,T) is deterministic. That is, the maximization of Uγ(ξ|ξ−i) overX (Xi,T)
is equivalent to the maximization overXdet(Xi,T). Therefore, it now follows as in the proof of Corollary
2.1 of [21] that the strategies (10) form a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization.
Proof of Proposition 2.9. Let us define a vector ω by ωi = 1 for i = 0, . . . , N−1 and ωN = 1/(1−e−ρ/N).
Then the assertion will follow if
(Γ0,θ − Γ˜)ω = c1 (23)
with c = 1
1−e−
ρ
N
. To this end, we note that, with δij denoting the Kronecker delta,(
(Γ0,θ − Γ˜)ω
)
i
=
(
(Γ˜> + 2θId)ω
)
i
= (Γ˜>ω)i + (2θIdω)i
=
G(0)
2
ωi +
N−1∑
j=i+1
G
( j
N
− i
N
)
ωj +G
(
1− i
N
)
ωN + 2θ
N∑
j=0
δijωj
=
(1
2
+ 2θ
)
ωi +
N−1∑
j=i+1
G
( j
N
− i
N
)
ωj +G
(
1− i
N
)
ωN .
Since θ = 1
4
, we have
(
(Γ0,θ − Γ˜)ω
)
i
=
N−1∑
j=i
G
( j
N
− i
N
)
ωj +G
(
1− i
N
)
ωN
= eρ
i
N
N−1∑
j=i
e−ρ
j
N +
e−ρ(1−
i
N
)
1− e−ρ/N
=
1
1− e−ρ/N .
This proves (23) and hence the assertion.
Now we prepare for the proof of Theorem 2.11.
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Lemma 3.4. For γ, σ, ρ > 0, the following equation has a unique positive solution α,
1
e(α+ρ) − 1 −
n
e(α−ρ) − 1 −
γσ2e−α
(1− e−α)2 = 0. (24)
Moreover, α ∈ (0, ρ).
Proof. By rearranging equation (24) we get
0 =
−(eρ − e−ρ) + (n− 1)(e−α − eρ)
(eα + e−α)− (eρ + e−ρ) +
γσ2
2− (eα + e−α)
=
γσ2
2− 2 cosh(α) +
−2 sinh(ρ) + (n− 1)(cosh(α)− sinh(α)− (cosh(ρ) + sinh(ρ)))
2 cosh(α)− 2 cosh(ρ)
=
γσ2
2− 2 cosh(α) −
sinh(ρ)
cosh(α)− cosh(ρ) +
(n− 1
2
)[
1− sinh(α) + sinh(ρ)
cosh(α)− cosh(ρ)
]
=: f(α) (25)
Clearly, when α > ρ > 0, then f(α) < 0. Therefore, if a zero of f exists, it must be within (0, ρ). One
easily sees that
lim
α↓0
f(α) = −∞ and lim
α↑ρ
f(α) = +∞.
Hence, f admits at least one zero in (0, ρ). Moreover,
df(α)
dα
=
2γσ2 sinh(α)
(2− 2 cosh(α))2 +
sinh(α) sinh(ρ)
(cosh(α)− cosh(ρ))2
+
(n− 1
2
)[sinh(α)(sinh(α) + sinh(ρ))
(cosh(α)− cosh(ρ))2 −
cosh(α)
cosh(α)− cosh(ρ)
]
> 0,
and so the zero must be unique.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose that γ, σ, ρ > 0 and θ ≥ 0. Then the following equation has a unique positive
solution β,
2θ +
1
2
+
1
e(β+ρ) − 1 −
γσ2e−β
(1− e−β)2 = 0. (26)
Proof. Let
g(β) = 2θ +
1
2
+
1
e(β+ρ) − 1 −
γσ2e−β
(1− e−β)2 .
Clearly,
lim
β↓0
g(β) = −∞ and lim
β↑∞
g(β) = 2θ +
1
2
> 0. (27)
Hence, there exists at least one zero in (0,∞). Next, we look at
dg(β)
dβ
= − e
(β+ρ)
(e(β+ρ) − 1)2 +
γσ2e−β
(1− e−β)2 +
2γσ2e−2β
(1− e−β)3
= γσ2e(β+ρ)(e(β+ρ) − 1)−2
[
(e(β+ρ) − 1)2(e−β + 1)
e(2β+ρ)(1− e−β)3 −
1
γσ2
]
.
Note that dg(β)
dβ
> 0 if
(e(β+ρ) − 1)2(e−β + 1)
e(2β+ρ)(1− e−β)3 −
1
γσ2
> 0.
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Here, (e
(β+ρ)−1)2(e−β+1)
e(2β+ρ)(1−e−β)3 is strictly decreasing and bounded below by e
ρ because for all β > 0,
d
dβ
(
(e(β+ρ) − 1)2(e−β + 1)
e(2β+ρ)(1− e−β)3
)
= −2e
(β−ρ)(e(β+ρ) − 1)(2e(β+ρ) − eβ + eρ − 2)
(eβ − 1)4 < 0,
and because by L’Hoˆpital’s Rule,
lim
β↑∞
(
(e(β+ρ) − 1)2(e−β + 1)
e(2β+ρ)(1− e−β)3
)
= lim
β↑∞
(e(β+ρ) − 1)2
e(2β+ρ)
= lim
β↑∞
2e(β+ρ)(e(β+ρ) − 1)
2e(2β+ρ)
= lim
β↑∞
eρ − e−β = eρ.
Therefore, we have two cases to consider:
1. when γσ2 ≥ e−ρ, we have that dg(β)
dβ
> 0 for all β > 0. It follows that there exists a unique β > 0
such that g(β) = 0;
2. when 0 < γσ2 < e−ρ, we can always find a unique β∗ such that dg(β)
dβ
> 0 for β < β∗ and
dg(β)
dβ
< 0 for β > β∗. In other words, (β∗, g(β∗)) is the global maximum of g(β) on (0,∞). Now
suppose g(β∗) ≤ 0. We know that g(β) is strictly decreasing on (β∗,∞), then for all β ∈ (β∗,∞),
g(β) < g(β∗) ≤ 0, which contradicts (27). Therefore, g(β∗) > 0, and 0 < 2θ + 1
2
< g(β) < g(β∗)
for all β ∈ (β∗,∞), which implies a zero cannot exist in (β∗,∞). Since g(β) is strictly increasing
on (0, β∗), it follows that there exists a unique β ∈ (0, β∗) such that g(β) = 0.
In either case, there exists a unique positive solution β that solves (26).
Proof of Theorem 2.11. Let us first extend the matrices (6) and (7) to our infinite time horizon by
letting
Γγ,θij = e
−ρ|i−j| + γσ2(i ∧ j) + 2θδij, i, j = 0, 1, . . . ,
and
Γ˜ij =

0 if i < j,
1
2
Γ0,0ii if i = j,
Γ0,0ij if i > j.
Next, let α be as provided by Lemma 3.4 and define a vector ν ∈ `1 by
ν0 =
1
1− e(α−ρ) , and, for i = 1, 2, . . . , νi = e
−αi.
We will now show that
[Γγ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜]ν = c1 for c = γσ
2e−α
(1− e−α)2 > 0, (28)
where 1 ∈ `∞ is the sequence (1, 1, . . . ). Using our assumption θ = θ∗ = n−1
4
, we get that(
[Γγ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜]ν
)
i
= Γγ,0i0 ν0 +
∞∑
j=1
Γγ,0ij νj + [2θδi0 + (n− 1)Γ˜i0]ν0 +
∞∑
j=1
[2θδij + (n− 1)Γ˜ij]νj
= e−ρiν0 +
∞∑
j=1
[e−ρ|i−j| + γσ2(i ∧ j)]e−αj + (n− 1)e−ρiν0 + (n− 1)
i∑
j=1
e−ρ(i−j)e−αj
= ne−ρiν0 +
∞∑
j=1
[e−ρ|i−j| + γσ2(i ∧ j)]e−αj + (n− 1)e−ρi
i∑
j=1
e−(α−ρ)j.
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Expanding the center term gives,
∞∑
j=1
[e−ρ|i−j| + γσ2(i ∧ j)]e−αj =
i∑
j=1
[e−ρ(i−j) + γσ2j]e−αj +
∞∑
j=i+1
[e−ρ(j−i) + γσ2i]e−αj
= e−ρi
i∑
j=1
e−(α−ρ)j + γσ2
i∑
j=1
je−αj + eρi
∞∑
j=i+1
e−(α+ρ)j + γσ2i
∞∑
j=i+1
e−αj.
Thus,(
[Γγ,θ + (n− 1)Γ˜]ν
)
i
= ne−ρiν0 + ne−ρi
i∑
j=1
e−(α−ρ)j + eρi
∞∑
j=i+1
e−(α+ρ)j + γσ2
i∑
j=1
je−αj + γσ2i
∞∑
j=i+1
e−αj
= ne−ρiν0 + n
[e−ρi − e−αi
e(α−ρ) − 1
]
+
e−αi
e(α+ρ) − 1 + (1− e
−αi)
γσ2e−α
(1− e−α)2
= ne−ρi
[ 1
1− e(α−ρ) +
1
e(α−ρ) − 1
]
+ e−αi
[ 1
e(α+ρ) − 1 −
n
e(α−ρ) − 1 −
γσ2e−α
(1− e−α)2
]
+
γσ2e−α
(1− e−α)2
=
γσ2e−α
(1− e−α)2 ,
where we have used ν0 =
1
1−e(α−ρ) and our equation (24) in the final step. This establishes (28). Now
we can define
v =
1
1>ν
ν =
1
1
eα−1 +
1
1−eα−ρ
ν,
which satisfies the equivalent of (8) in our setting with infinite time horizon.
Let us now deal with the vector w. To this end, we take β as provided by Lemma 3.5 and define
ω ∈ `1 by ωi = e−βi. Then
[(Γγ,θ − Γ˜)ω]i = (2θ + 1
2
)e−βi + eρi
∞∑
j=i+1
e−(β+ρ)j + γσ2
i∑
j=0
je−βj + γσ2i
∞∑
j=i+1
e−βj
= e−βi
[
2θ +
1
2
+
1
e(β+ρ) − 1 −
γσ2e−β
(1− e−β)2
]
+
γσ2e−β
(1− e−β)2
=
γσ2e−β
(1− e−β)2 .
It follows that we can define
w =
1
1>ω
ω =
eβ − 1
eβ
ω,
which satisfies the equivalent of (9) in our setting with infinite time horizon.
Finally, if initial positions X1, . . . , Xn ∈ R are given, and we define ξ1, . . . , ξn via (16), then it is
straightforward to verify that of the first-order conditions (19) are verified with our current choices for
v, w, Γγ,θ, and Γ˜. As in (22), these yield that ξ1, . . . , ξn form a Nash equilibrium for mean-variance
optimization. As in the proof of Theorem 2.4, one then concludes that this is also a Nash equilibrium
for CARA utility maximization.
18
Proof of Proposition 2.13. If n = 1 and γ > 0, we want to find an α that satisfies
1
e(α+ρ) − 1 −
1
e(α−ρ) − 1 −
γσ2e−α
(1− e−α)2 = 0.
If follows from (25) that
γσ2
2− 2 cosh(α) −
sinh(ρ)
cosh(α)− cosh(ρ) = 0.
By rearranging the equation we have
cosh(α) =
γσ2 cosh(ρ) + 2 sinh(ρ)
γσ2 + 2 sinh(ρ)
.
Since ρ > 0, we have sinh(ρ) > 0 and cosh(ρ) > 1, which implies,
γσ2 cosh(ρ) + 2 sinh(ρ)
γσ2 + 2 sinh(ρ)
> 1.
Therefore, we can solve for α and obtain
α = cosh−1
[γσ2 cosh(ρ) + 2 sinh(ρ)
γσ2 + 2 sinh(ρ)
]
.
Furthermore, since ρ > 0 implies that
γσ2 cosh(ρ) + 2 sinh(ρ)
γσ2 + 2 sinh(ρ)
< cosh(ρ)
and cosh−1(·) is an increasing function, we have that 0 < α < ρ.
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